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STATE ANTI-TAKEOVER LEGISLATION AND THE
NATIONAL ECONOMY
JONATHAN R. MACEY*
In this Article, Professor Jonathan Macey argues that current anti-takeover
laws waste corporate assets, fail to protect the shareholders' interests and present a
significant threat to our national economy.
Professor Macey asserts that takeovers maximize shareholder wealth and pro-
duce corporate efficiency by forcing lower prices and improvements in productivity.
Conversely, anti-takeover laws harm firms because the laws create uncertainty for
shareholders. Professor Macey attacks public interest arguments raised in favor of
these laws which suggest that shareholders need the protection of the laws. He says
that shareholders are not victims of coercion in a legitimate takeover attempt, but
rather enjoy the profits of an auction market for their stock. The problem of collec-
tive action on the part of shareholders is best solved at the firm level through intra-
firm agreements or anti-takeover devices adopted through normal intra-firm deci-
sion-making. Professor Macey then rejects the local interests justification for these
laws, arguing that takeovers result in at most a geographic shifting of wealth. He also
disputes the notion that these laws prevent management from focusing on short-term
gains, because he sees no tension between maximizing firm value for the present and
for the future.
Finally, Professor Macey predicts adverse consequences for the national econ-
omy as a result of the current wave of state anti-takeover legislation. Shareholders
will no longer realize the maximum value for their shares and the market for corpo-
rate investment will be chilled. Professor Macey also concludes that the problems
inherent in state laws are equally present in federal laws. He argues that the only laws
necessary are enabling legislation permitting intra-firm agreements between share-
holders and management for responding to tender offers.
I. INTRODUCTION
We seem to have come full circle in providing legal rules for corpo-
rations in this country. In post-revolutionary America, corporate char-
ters were not granted as a matter of right as they are today.1 Consistent
with the British system in existence at the time, states granted corporate
charters to individual entrepreneurs on a case by case basis.2 Because
the decision to grant or deny a firm status as a corporation involved the
* Professor of Law, Cornell University. A.B., Harvard College, 1977; J.D., Yale Law
School, 1982. Copyright 1987, Jonathan R. Macey.
I. The modern chartering system is characterized by the ability of firms to incorporate
for any lawful purpose, a right not common in the United States until 1875. Shugart & Tollison,
Corporate Chartering: An Exploration in the Economics of Legal Change, 23 ECON. INQUIRY 585,
585 (1985) (citing Ligget Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 (1933)).
2. Id. at 586 ("The few organizations incorporated for business purposes were pat-
terned after the English trading company and their charters typically conferred monopoly privi-
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political process, state legislators were able to trade corporate charters
for political favors. Firms were quite willing to pay legislators for the
privilege of obtaining a charter, either in the form of outright bribes or
in the form of promised political support, because a corporate charter
often conveyed monopoly status upon the lucky recipient.
In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in CTS Corp. v. Dy-
namics Corp. of America,3 which validated the ability of state legislators
to insulate incumbent management teams from threats of competition,
those in charge of the corporate firm once again are returning to their
local legislators for protection against the forces of competition. As
before, the statutes being passed are promulgated to protect the inter-
ests of individual firms rather than the interests of the public or the
shareholders of the firms affected.
The statutes come in a variety of forms,4 but all share the common
feature of serving to consolidate the ability to respond to tender offers
lege for the term of the corporate contract.") (citing I W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (1974)).
3. 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
4. The current spate of state anti-takeover laws is a medley of laws known as "second-
generation" and "third-generation" laws. Second-generation laws were written to avoid the con-
stitutional problems that caused the Supreme Court to invalidate the first-generation laws, as in
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982). Third-generation laws were passed after the Court's
opinion in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
Anti-takeover provisions come in four varieties. See Mendelsohn & Berg, Tender-Offer Bat-
ties in Legislative Arena Shift to Pre-emption, Legal Times, Sept. 14, 1987, at 26, col. 3 The first are
called control-share acquisition provisions. Statutes with such provisions require shareholder ap-
proval before acquirers of large blocks of stock can vote their shares. The typical thresholds are 20,
33 and 50%. See Id. at 26, col. 3.
Certain anti-takeover statutes contain so-called "fair price" provisions, which require that a
firm obtain a two-thirds or higher supermajority vote of its shareholders before entering into a
business combination with a person owning a certain, threshold percentage of the firm's stock. The
only way to avoid the necessity of a shareholder vote is for the business combination to obtain the
approval of the board of directors or for the acquirer to pay a fair price for the shares acquired in
the combination. See Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. I 11,
116 (1987). A "fair price" is defined as "the higher of any price the interested party [acquirer] paid
to obtain its shares or the market price at the time of the combination." Id.
A third variety of state anti-takeover provision is contained in "redemption rights" statutes
and "control-share acquisition statutes." These statutes entitle shareholders to receive, on de-
mand, from an acquirer, an amount of cash equal to the "fair value of the stock, including the
proportional increment payable as a control premium .... The effect of the statute is to convert
partial offers into any-or-all offers." Id. at 116-17.
The fourth variety of state law is the five-year freeze-out fair-price statute. See Mendelsohn
& Berg, Tender-Offr Battles in Legislative Arena Shift to Pre-emption, Legal Times, Sept. 14, 1987,
at 26, col. 3. These statutes prohibit business combinations with interested shareholders for five
years after the acquisition of the interest. These statutes resemble the fair-price statutes because
they generally require approval of a majority of disinterested shares even after the five-year period
has elapsed. See Romano, supra, at 117 n.17.
An additional wrinkle in some state anti-takeover statutes, such as the one adopted in Min-
nesota, is that they require boards of directors to consider how a takeover of the firm would affect
a number of constituencies besides shareholders when the boards are deciding how to respond to a
tender offer. For example, in Minnesota directors are required to evaluate how a takeover could
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in the hands of the incumbent managers of the firms that are the targets
of such offers.' Some statutes go so far as to enable managers and direc-
tors to abrogate the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty traditionally
owed to shareholders by enabling or requiring such managers and di-
rectors to consider the effects of a takeover on customers, employees,
suppliers, creditors and even the local economy when deciding whether
or not to resist a takeover.6 Other state statutes provide discretion to
incumbent managers and directors to impede and delay unwanted
tender offers, thereby significantly raising their cost.'
This Article argues that, while resistance to tender offers may be in
the shareholders' interest in certain instances, in other situations it
clearly is not. Takeovers generally maximize shareholder welfare by
weeding out inefficient incumbent management and permitting new
management teams to increase the value of the firm by redeploying the
firm's assets to more profitable ises. Inhibiting takeovers transfers
wealth from shareholders to incumbent management teams. In those
instances where resistance furthers shareholder welfare, adequate pro-
vision for resistance can be obtained through intra-firm contracts. Such
intra-firm agreements manifest themselves in the form of amendments
to corporate charters and by-laws. No state legislation, other than
enabling laws that ensure the validity of these intra-firm contractual
arrangements, is needed to protect shareholders.
In a pioneering article, Roberta Romano argued that the state of
Connecticut enacted an anti-takeover statute at the behest of a single
politically powerful corporation, rather than through the interplay of a
number of competing interest groups.8 The corporation, the Aetna Life
and Casualty Company, persuaded the Connecticut legislature to pass
the statute despite the strong possibility that the firm's own sharehold-
ers would have declined to support a similar measure if the matter had
been put to them for a vote.9 Romano observed that several other state
statutes were apparently passed at the behest of particular firms. Specif-
ically, she noted that Maine, Pennsylvania, Illinois and Missouri had
affect employees, suppliers, creditors and even the communities where the corporation is located
or has significant operations. See Goodman, State Takeover Legislation, I INSIGHTS: THE CORP. &
SEC. L. ADVISOR 2 (1987). The Minnesota statute also requires the board to evaluate the effect of
the takeover on the state and national economies. Id.
5. See D. Oesterle, State Takeover Statutes: "Economic Folly?" (1987) (manuscript on
file with author).
6. See supra note 4.
7. Id.
8. Romano, The Political EcononmY of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. I 11, 122-34
(1987) ("Although the takeover legislation was unopposed in the state legislature, there is no evi-
dence to support a coalition explanation.").
9. Id. at 129-30.
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passed statutes to benefit individual firms that were threatened with
outsider takeovers.' 0
Other state anti-takeover measures also appear to reflect the lob-
bying of a single-minded political group of individual firms rather than
a broader political consensus. The action of the legislature that Ro-
mano observed in Connecticut appears to be repeating itself across'the
country. In North Carolina, for example, Burlington Industries per-
suaded the legislature to adopt an anti-takeover statute in order to
thwart a hostile takeover by Asher Edelman and Dominion Textile
Corporation. 1 Indiana enacted a control-share acquisition statute and
a freeze-out fair-price statute in response to the threatened takeover of
Arvin Industries by the Belzberg family.'" Similarly, the threaten'ed
takeover of Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company "galvanized the
Ohio legislature to pass a new [anti-takeover] law." 3 And it is well
known that Washington's anti-takeover statute was passed at the be-
hest of Boeing Industries.14
The list goes on. In perhaps the most shameless transfer of wealth
from shareholders to incumbent management, Dayton Hudson Corpo-
ration prevailed upon the Governor of Minnesota to call a special legis-
lative session so that a law could be passed to protect the firm from
takeover by Dart Group, Inc.' 5 In Massachusetts, to relieve any linger-
ing doubts about the special-interest basis of that state's anti-takeover
statute, the Governor appeared at a Gillette Company plant to sign the
statute into effect. Gillette had been the subject of a takeover attempt by
Revlon.' 6 In Wisconsin, when the G. Heileman Brewing Company of
LaCrosse came under attack from Bond Holdings Corporation, Heile-
man persuaded Governor Tommy Thompson to convene a special leg-
islative session at which a particularly draconian anti-takeover measure
was enacted into law. 17
10. Id. at 137.
1I. Goodman, State Takeover Legislation, I INSIGHTS: THE CORP. & SEC. L. ADVISOR 2
(1987).
,12. Mendelsohn & Berg, Tender-Offer Battles in Legislative Arenas Shift to Pre-emption,
Legal Times, Sept. 14, 1987, at 26, col. 3.
13. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, SHARE-
HOLDER WEALTH EFFECTS OF OHIO LEGISLATION AFFECTING TAKEOVERS, at I (May 18, 1987).
14. N.Y. Times, Aug. I1, 1987, § 4, col. 3.
15. See Glassman, Free Gift, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 27, 1987, at 10.
16. See Goodman, supra note 1I, at 2.
17. Ironically, soon after the Wisconsin act was' signed into law, Heileman and Bond
began negotiating and Heileman's management ultimately endorsed an offer of $40.75 for the
firm's stock. It seems likely that the Wisconsin law actually facilitated the merger by improving
Heileman's negotiating position. Note: The Wisconsin law was recently struck down by the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. RTE Corp. v. Mark IV Indus., Inc.,
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) '- 93.789 (May 6. 1988).-Eds.
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This Article considers the effects that these state anti-takeover pro-
visions are likely to have on the national economy if they are allowed to
proliferate at their current rate. First, this Article begins with a general
discussion of the benefits that takeovers have on the economy and an
analysis of the ways in which state anti-takeover laws deprive the econ-
omy of these benefits. Second, this Article analyzes the various argu-
ments in favor of state takeover provisions. This Article will show that
most states are peculiarly ill-suited to provide socially desirable take-
over legislation because the parties with the greatest stake in achieving
efficient legal rules are systematically underrepresented in the political
process. State anti-takeover laws represent the creation of a political
externality in which state legislatures are able to provide benefits to lo-
cal interests by imposing costs on politically disorganized individuals
who do not reside within the state.
Ultimately, the proffered public interest explanations of these stat-
utes must give way to recognition that the statutes are nothing more
than extremely costly devices for providing job protection for inefficient
top level managers of poorly run firms and for keeping jobs in particu-
lar regions at the expense of more productive workers in other regions.
Such protectionism is costly not only to the shareholders of these firms,
but also to consumers and workers. This Article concludes with a dis-
cussion of the long-term economic effects of these statutes.
II. THE ROLE OF TAKEOVERS IN THE NATIONAL ECONOMY
Perhaps a complete answer to the question of whether takeovers
benefit the national economy is contained in the evidence of the gains
realized by those lucky shareholders whose firms are the subject of a
tender offer. The Office of the Chief Economist of the Securities and
Exchange Commission found that target firm shareholders enjoyed an
average gain of 5 3.2% on the sale of their shares. 8 Assuming that bid-
ding firms are acting rationally,19 the gains to target shareholders must
reflect the fact that the acquirer believes the target firm is either (1) cur-
rently undervalued or (2) properly valued under its current manage-
ment, but capable of attaining higher value if reorganized or managed
by a different management team. In light of the overwhelming evidence
supporting the hypothesis that capital markets are efficient in the sense
that they fully reflect all available information about the firms whose
shares are being traded,2" significant takeover activity is very unlikely
to occur for the reason that target firms somehow are undervalued in
18. Comment & Jarrell, Two Tier and Negotiated Tender Qffers, 19 J. FIN. ECON. 283
(1987).
19. See inl/a section II. D.
20. See infa notes 40-47 and accompanying text (discussing capital market efficiency).
1988:467.
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the marketplace. Rather, it is more likely that tender offers are launched
because the acquirer can realize gains by reorganizing the firm, replac-
ing existing management, or combining the target firm's assets with the
assets of the bidding firm so as to create value.
The wealth-enhancing view of takeovers is supported by the fact
that top managers lose their jobs when their firms are the subject of a
successful hostile takeover. Sixty-two percent of top managers lose
their jobs within three years of a hostile takeover compared with a rate
of 21% every three years in firms with no change in control."' As Pro-
fessor Michael Jensen recently observed:
The restructuring of corporate America . . . that is being
brought about by the takeover market is streamlining many
of the largest and most complex corporations that are simply
too large, too complicated and too unfocused to be efficient.
Restructuring is bringing top level managers closer to em-
ployees, customers and shareholders. We must not strangle
these productive forces.22
Thus, not only are takeovers beneficial to the shareholders of the firms
being acquired, takeovers also provide substantial benefits to society at
large. These gains come in the form of improving the productivity of
American corporations so that goods and services reach Americans at
lower prices, and enabling American firms to compete more effectively
in global product markets.
The individual firms involved in a particular takeover are not the
only firms that benefit as a consequence of a robust market for corpo-
rate control. Professors Easterbrook and Fischel argue that all firms
will be more productive if incumbent management has reason to believe
that a hostile takeover is a possibility. The threat of displacement in
such a takeover provides management with a strong incentive to maxi-
mize firm value. "[S]hareholders benefit [from tender offer bids] even if
their corporation never is the subject of a tender offer. The process of
monitoring by outsiders poses a continuous threat of takeover if per-
formance lags. Managers will attempt to reduce agency costs in order to
reduce the chance of takeover....
The point here is not simply that state anti-takeover laws harm the
shareholders of the firms directly affected by the laws-that point is
21. Jensen, A Helping Hand for Entrenched Managers, Wall St. J., Nov. 4, 1987, at 30,
col. 6.
22. Id.
23. Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target s Management in Responding to
a Tender Oi,r, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1161, 1174 (1981) (footnote omitted).
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obvious and well documented."4 Rather, the point is that state legisla-
tion restricting takeovers harms not only the firms in the particular
state involved but all firms in all states. The possibility of states passing
such legislation at short notice upon the request of the incumbent man-
agement of a particular firm means that no shareholder is safe from
having her wealth appropriated by an opportunistic incumbent man-
agement team determined to keep its job at the expense of shareholders.
The existence of anti-takeover statutes, along with the possibility that
more will be passed, reduces the incentives to prospective bidders to
engage in a search for mismanaged firms and underdeployed assets by
lowering the expected payoff of such a search. Incumbent management,
no longer threatened with the possibility of a takeover, has less incen-
tive to maximize firm value.
Suppose, for example, that firm X is chartered in a state which
does not possess an anti-takeover statute, and firm Y is chartered in a
state which does have such a statute. Further suppose that the two firms
are identical in all respects except for their situs of incorporation. It
would seem that firm X will be worth more than firm Y because its
managers will have greater incentive to maximize value for sharehold-
ers by, for example, improving product quality, because failure to make
such improvements might result in a hostile takeover. Unfortunately,
there exists the possibility that a threat of impending takeover might
result in the management of firm X prevailing upon the legislature of
the state in which it is incorporated to pass an anti-takeover statute of
its own. Failing that, firm X might reincorporate in a state which does
have an anti-takeover statute in order to thwart a threatened takeover.
The fact that these options are available to firm X's management
reduces the value of firm X because the options reduce the probability
that there will be a hostile tender offer for the firm's shares at a premium
over the current market price, and also because they reduce the incen-
tives that potential bidders have to monitor the firm's management.
While it may be possible for firms to issue credible, bonded
promises to refrain from reincorporating or lobbying their local legisla-
tures as described above, such contracting is by no means costless or
certain because there exists the possibility that firms will renege on their
promises after an initial bid is made. Indeed, such post-bid opportu-
nism often will be in the interests of target firm shareholders because it
will facilitate the creation of an auction market for the target firm,
24. See intra notes 61-66 and accompanying text (discussing empirical evidence of
wealth effects of state anti-takeover laws).
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thereby enabling the firm's shareholders to realize an even higher price
for its shares.2"
State anti-takeover statutes also harm the shareholders of all firms
because, taken together, the patchwork quilt of state and federal laws
concerning takeovers is likely to increase significantly the costs to firms
that engage in the already costly business of launching tender offers. As
these costs go up, the possibility of shareholders realizing the significant
gains that accompany such transactions goes down, as fewer firms are
willing to serve in the role of bidder-monitor.
Arthur Fleischer, Jr., a noted takeover specialist, has observed that
"[i]f state acts continue to be upheld, takeovers may be regulated by a
patchwork combination of federal and state laws with the nature and
extent of investor protection and the balance between bidders and
targets dependent upon the state in which the target is incorporated." 26
Other practitioners have reached identical conclusions.27 Simply put,
when the rules of the takeover game become more complicated, the ad-
vantages of playing the game decline. Of particular concern is the fact
that an individual firm may be subject to the anti-takeover provisions of
more than one state's statute because many of the statutes purport to
apply to firms with headquarters or significant operations within the
state as well as to firms incorporated in the state.
Thus it seems probable that anti-takeover laws passed by particu-
lar states impose costs on all firms, regardless of the locations of the
firms. Such statutes lower the returns to bidders of engaging in the
costly search necessary to discover poorly managed or otherwise under-
valued firms. This diminution in returns to bidders reduces their incen-
tives to engage in searches and results in lower levels of monitoring for
potential firms. These lower levels of monitoring translate into in-
creased managerial shirking, that is, reduced managerial performance.
In the near-term shareholders are harmed. Ultimately consumers are
harmed as well because the managerial entrenchment caused by state
anti-takeover laws leads to lower quality products being produced at
higher prices by firms isolated from the discipline of the market for cor-
porate control.
An additional, and generally ignored, economic benefit of a robust
market for corporate control is the role that takeovers play in reducing
the incidence of bankruptcies in the economy. From an economic per-
25. See Haddock, Macey & McChesney, Properti Rights in Assets and Resistance to
Tender Offers, 73 VA. L. REV. 701, 728-30 (1987).
26. Goodman, supra note I1, at 2 (quoting Arthur Fleischer, Jr.).
27. See Mendelsohn & Berg, supra note 12, at 27, col. I ("[I]t is possible for 50 separate
state anti-takeover [statutes] to coexist. Such a fragmentary tender-offer regulatory system could
create uncertainty, inconsistency and confusion in our capital markets, thereby impairing our na-
tional economy.").
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spective, takeovers are low-cost substitutes for insolvencies and dissolu-
tions. They serve the important purpose of facilitating the restructuring
of inefficient conglomerate business forms and the redeployment of
under-utilized assets. As Professor Dewey observed early in the take-
over debate, such transactions "have virtually nothing to do with either
the creation of market power or the realization of scale economies.
They are merely a civilized alternative to bankruptcy or the voluntary
liquidation that transfers assets from falling to rising firms." 2 And as
Henry Manne pointed out in his classic article, Mergers and the Market
for Corporate Control, mergers are "desirable before bankruptcy be-
comes imminent in order to avoid that eventuality." 29 In other words,
if mergers were not retarded by legal impediments, "we should antici-
pate relatively few actual bankruptcy proceedings in any industry
which was not itself contracting. The function so wastefully performed
by bankruptcies and liquidations would be economically performed by
mergers at a much earlier stage of the firm's life."
30
The observation that hostile takeovers are a low-cost substitute for
insolvency is a direct implication from the observation that takeovers
serve the important purpose of causing assets to flow to their highest
valuing users. The problem is that many state legislators would prefer
to see a firm languish or die at home rather than thrive in some other
state.
III. THE PUBLIC INTEREST ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF
STATE ANTI-TAKEOVER LEGISLATION
Several public interest explanations are advanced to counter the
contention that state anti-takeover laws are nothing more than amor-
-ally redistributive special interest legislation that provide benefits for
incumbent management at the expense of workers and shareholders. 3 '
Proponents of these statutes argue that they are needed to protect
workers from being displaced from their jobs and to protect sharehold-
ers from their inability to mount a collective response to a hostile bid.
In addition, proponents of these statutes argue that they are needed to
protect incumbent management from being so mesmerized by the
28. Dewey, Mergers and Cartels: Some Reservations about Policy, 51 AM. ECON. REV.
255, 257 (1961).
29. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECoN. 110, 111
(1965).
30. i. at 112.
31. The term "amorally redistributive'" as a description for statutes that transfer wealth
from poorly organized political groups to better organized groups was first used by Richard Pos-
ner. See Posner, Economics. Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L.
REv. 263, 268 (1982).
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short-term need to maximize current share prices that they neglect the
long-term welfare of their firms.
Beginning with the problem of shareholders' inability to mount a
collective response to coercive offers, this Section of this Article consid-
ers the various public interest arguments supporting state anti-takeover
legislation. In the end, it is apparent that none of these arguments has
merit. Managerial self-interest remains the sole explanation for state
anti-takeover legislation.
A. The Problem of Collective Shareholder Response
In theory, tender offers for the shares of publicly held firms can
coerce shareholders into selling their shares at suboptimal prices. Ra-
tional shareholders fear that if they do not tender they will lose any
opportunity of realizing a premium for their shares, because a sufficient
number of their fellow shareholders will tender to satisfy the require-
ments of the purchaser. Therefore, shareholders who are offered an im-
mediate premium for their shares have a strong incentive to tender at
once in order to ensure that they will receive that premium, even if they
think that by refiaining from tendering they might later realize an even
greater price. This predicament is a classic collective action problem: if
all shareholders could get together and coordinate their response to the
bid (that is, if together they could agree to hold out for more money)
then they would be able to realize an even higher price. 32 In the absence
of such coordination, however, the shareholders will be "coerced" into
tendering at a sub-optimal price. 3
One mechanism for overcoming the collective action problem fac-
ing target firm shareholders is to authorize incumbent management or
some other more independent group to negotiate on behalf of the target
shareholders. 34 To the extent that state anti-takeover statutes empower
32. Readers with a background in economics will recognize that characteristics of the
classic prisoner's dilemma face target shareholders. For descriptions of the prisoner's dilemma
game, see P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMicS 482-83 (8th ed. 1970).
33. See Macey & McChesney, A Theoretical Analysis of'Corporate Greenmail, 95 YALE
L.J. 13, 19-28 (1985); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 23.
34. In theory, the common law fiduciary duties of care and loyalty require managers to
place the interests of shareholders first when evaluating outside bids. But judicial enforcement of
these fiduciary duties is problematic, as it is exceedingly difficult for courts to determine when
particular managerial defensive tactics are in shareholders' interests and when they are not. See
Macey & McChesney, supra note 33, at 53-60 (discussing one particular defensive tactic, corporate
greenmail payments, and concluding that "after the fact, it is difficult to determine whether a
specific greenmail payment ultimately served the interests of the shareholders."). In addition, the
derivative suit, which is the legal mechanism through which most shareholder complaints reach
the courts, is itself fraught with difficulties. See Fischel & Bradley, The Role of Liahility Rules and
the Derivative Suit i Corporate Low: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV.
261. 292 (1986) (the widespread assumption that "liability rules enforced by derivative suits play a
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incumbent managers to engage in such negotiations on behalf of share-
holders, the statutes can conceivably be viewed as valuable devices for
overcoming the shareholders' collective action problem.
The anti-takeover statutes being considered here do not merely
empower incumbent management to bargain on behalf of shareholders;
they virtually mandate that shareholders provide managers with this
authority. In light of the ability of shareholders to enact intra-firm con-
tracts that empower managers to act on shareholders' behalf in the
event of a takeover, state legislation accomplishing the same end seems
not only unnecessary but positively detrimental to shareholders' inter-
ests for several reasons.
First, the requirement that incumbent management negotiate on
behalf of shareholders deprives the shareholders of the ability to elect
an alternative bargaining agent for the purpose of negotiating with
outside bidders. The obvious conflict of interest between shareholders,
who are interested in maximizing the price of their shares, and manag-
ers, who are interested in retaining and securing their positions, sug-
gests that at least some firms might find it desirable to elect bargaining
agents other than incumbents.
Similarly, despite the existence of a collective action problem,
shareholders of certain firms might not benefit by providing third par-
ties with power to bargain with prospective bidders. Where a firm has a
number of institutional investors, or other highly aggregated share-
holders, the collective action problem may not loom particularly large
because communication and coordination among individual share-
holders is possible at low cost.
In addition, the ability to bargain collectively is not an unmitigated
good. As discussed above, this bargaining ability raises the expected
costs to bidding firms and thus lowers the probability that a prospective
bidder will ever emerge to offer shareholders a premium for their
shares. This decreased probability of a future offer lowers the present
value of the firm's shares. Empowering incumbent management to ne-
gotiate with prospective bidders lowers the level of monitoring carried
on by such outside bidders, and this lower level of monitoring repre-
sents another cost to shareholders. Only if these costs are offset by the
gains associated with empowering incumbent management to negotiate
will target shareholders benefit from empowering management to en-
gage in such negotiations.
The point here is not that defensive tactics that mitigate the collec-
tive action problem facing target shareholders are always contrary to
shareholders' interests. Rather, the point is that every firm has unique
fundamental role in aligning the interests of manager and investors ... is not supported by either
the theory of liability rules, the available evidence, or the structure of corporate law.").
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problems and thus defensive tactics that benefit one firm may harm an-
other. The optimal solution appears to be to address the problem at the
firm level rather than at the level of state-sponsored legislation.
One final argument in favor of legislating at the state level to solve
this collective action problem concerns uncertainty in the legal system.
It might be argued that state legislation is necessary because privately
implemented anti-takeover provisions may be struck down by the
courts as involving a breach of management's fiduciary duty of care or
loyalty to target firm shareholders.35 This argument is wholly unper-
suasive. If there is ambiguity about the legality of the intra-firm con-
tracting process that enables shareholders to solve the collective action
problem facing them in a tender offer situation, the problem could eas-
ily be solved by legislation empowering firms to enact such intra-firm
agreements. 36 The mandatory provisions currently being passed by
state legislatures are entirely inappropriate because shareholders are
not sufficiently empowered to opt out of them. 7
B. The Goal of Protecting Local Jobs
In light of the fact that major national unions and other elements
of organized labor in the United States are voicing opposition to state
anti-takeover statutes, the argument that these statutes benefit workers
immediately appears suspect. Proponents of the statutes claim that
without the statutes heartless raiders (perhaps even "looters") will take
over good old American firms and fire all of the workers or unilaterally
reduce their wages. The available evidence indicates that this is not the
case.38 Indeed, a recent National Bureau of Economic Research study
of takeovers in Michigan shows that wages and employment of firms
involved in acquisitions actually increase.39
Acquirers often sell subsidiaries and divisions of the firms that they
take over. However, these spin-off transactions generally do not result
in loss of jobs for rank-and-file employees because the new firm owners
seldom if ever liquidate the subsidiary and fire the employees. Generally
only the administrative positions of relatively high-level employees be-
35. See D. Oesterle, supra note 5, at 12; see also Oesterle, The Negotiation Model of
Tender Offer Defenses and the Delaware Supreme Court, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 117, 133-35 (1986).
36. See Haddock, Macey & McChesney, supra note 25, at 727-37.
37. The subject of the opt out provisions of these state anti-takeover statutes is worthy of
an article in-and-of itself. Suffice it to say that for many of the provisions, firms simply are unable
to opt out, and for these, that is, managers and directors generally can opt in either by doing
nothing or by acting unilaterally, that is, without shareholder approval.
38. See Jarrell, Brickley & Netter, The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical
Evidence Since 1980, at 19 (1987) (unpublished manuscript).
39. C. BROWN & J. L. MEDOFF, THE IMPACT OF FIRM ACQUISITIONS ON LABOR (working
paper 1987).
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come redundant after a takeover. At worst, the workers in a particular
state will be displaced by workers in another state as the firm's assets
are redeployed to that state. But when this happens, overall national
employment is unaffected. The only effects are local. When state anti-
takeover statutes prevent jobs from leaving one state for another, they
result in discrimination against out-of-state workers in favor of local
workers. This local favoritism is inconsistent with the spirit of the na-
tional labor union movement.
C. Prevention of Managerial Focus on the Short-Term
Many of the managers of America's large, publicly held corpora-
tions argue that the very threat of hostile takeovers is bad for American
business. The harm comes because managers, constantly threatened
with losing their jobs, do not focus on the long-term strategic planning
that is vital to their firms' health but instead focus on the short-term
goal of keeping share prices high in order to ward off potential bidders.
In this regard the words of John G. Smale, the chairman and chief
executive officer of Procter & Gamble, are instructive:
Widespread hostile takeover activity has made maximizing
immediate shareholder value appear to be the basic purpose
of a business enterprise. Some defend hostile takeovers as ad-
herence to free enterprise-as reliance on market forces to
structure and restructure our economy. But this emphasis
will, if not appropriately curbed, have just the opposite ef-
fect. . . .I can say that by focusing on the short term, our
publicly held business enterprises will see their competitive
position decay, their resiliency in difficult times undermined,
and their standing in society compromised.
There is, of course, nothing new about a corporation's
fundamental responsibility to its owners. What is new is the
role of what I'll call the "temporary" owner, whose sole inter-
est is that of a speculator looking for the "fast buck." 4
This argument is flawed in two important respects. First, it miscon-
strues the basis upon which the market determines share prices for pub-
licly traded firms. Second, it mistakenly presumes that managers have
some disembodied duty to the corporations for which they work that is
distinct from their fiduciary duty to maximize share value for the firms'
residual claimants, whether or not they are "temporary owners."
40. Smale, What About Shareowners' Responsibility?, Wall St. J., Oct. 16, 1987, at 24,
col. 2.
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There is no real debate about the fundamental issue of how the
market determines the price of publicly held shares. The price of such
stock reflects the market's estimation of the present value of the net
future earnings of the firm. This estimate, in turn, is based on the pub-
licly available information about the firm's performance, and the mar-
ket's estimate of the firm's future earnings prospects. This observation
is virtually self-evident. After all, a share of stock is simply an asset and
asset values are a function of discounted future flows.
The development and testing of the Efficient Capital Market Hy-
pothesis (ECMH) has contributed substantially to our understanding
of how share prices are determined.4 1 The theory posits that share
prices fully reflect information about the earnings prospects of the firms
to which they pertain. This is because information processors in search
of profits quickly discover "undervalued" firms and purchase their
shares, thereby driving share prices to their correct levels virtually in-
stantaneously.42 Thus, according to the Hypothesis, "in an efficient
market at any point in time the actual price of a security will be a good
estimate of its intrinsic value."
43
As Professor Michael Jensen has observed, "there is no other
proposition in economics which has more solid empirical evidence sup-
porting it than the Efficient Market Hypothesis."' 44 The Hypothesis
41. See J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 70-97
(1973); Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383
(1970); Comment, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory and the Regulation of
the Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1031, 1034 (1977).
42. Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549
(1984).
43. Fama, Random Walks in Stock Market Prices, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Sept.-Oct. 1965, at
55.
44. Jensen, Some Anomalous Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency, 6 J. FIN. ECON. 95,
95 (1978). For discussions of the numerous tests supporting the hypothesis in its various forms, see
Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 42, at 555.
Empirical studies have found several anomalies in stock returns that appear to be inconsist-
ent with the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis. Most notable among these are the price-earnings
effect, the small-firm effect and the January effect. Initially it was thought that firms with higher
price-earnings ratios (a price-earnings ratio is calculated by dividing a firm's stock price by its
earnings per share) earned abnormally high returns on a risk-adjusted basis, a finding inconsistent
with the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis. Basu, Investment Performance of Common Stocks in
Relation to their Price Earnings Ratios: A Test of the Efficient Market Hypothesis, 32 J. FIN. 663
(1977). A later study, however, by Professor Reinganum found the P/E effect to disappear when
firm size was factored into the equation. Reinganum, Misspecification of Capital Asset Pricing:
Empirical Anomalies Based on Earnings' Yields and Market Values, 9 J. FIN. ECON. 19 (1981). In
essence, the P/E effect was seen to be a small-firm effect: small firms have been found to have higher
risk-adjusted returns than larger firms. See Banz, The Relationship Between Return and Market
Value of Common Stocks, 9 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1981).
In addition to the small-firm effect, financial economists searching for market inefficiencies
have discovered the "January effect." As the name implies, studies examining the January effect
show that stock price returns are abnormally high in the month of January. Gultekin & Gultekin,
Stock Return Anomalies and the Tests of the APT. 42 J. FIN. 1213 (1987); Tinic & West, Risk and
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should inform our view of how the law of corporations, financial in-
termediaries and financial markets ought to evolve.45
The basic lesson to be learned from the Efficient Capital Market
Hypothesis is that what matters in the stock market is the future not the
past, because past events have already become reflected in the firm's
share price performance and therefore such information is worthless to
investors. What matters is the market's perception about the firm's fu-
ture income flows. The market's estimate about the size of these flows
will be discounted back to present value and constitute the firm's share
price.
The point, of course, is that the distinction between maximizing
firm value for the present versus maximizing firm value for the future is
wholly false. What matters in determining the value of a firm's shares is
the present value of all flows-present and future. To argue that hostile
takeovers force managers to focus on the short-term at the expense of
the future is to ignore this reality. Earnings from investments in the
future-even if such investments produce no immediate income to the
firm-are reflected immediately in a firm's current share price.46
For the same reason, characterizing some shareholders as "tempo-
rary" (only interested in the short run) and others as "permanent"
(only interested in the long run) is fatuous. Temporary shareholders
and permanent shareholders realize the same gain from future events.
The temporary shareholder realizes the value of future events in the
form of high current price/earnings multiples and high current prices
for shares. The permanent shareholder realizes the value of future
events in the form of long-term gains when the stock ultimately is sold
and in the form of valuable collateral for current borrowing. Both
groups have an interest in investing in firms whose managers invest in
all projects with a positive present value.
The theoretical arguments presented above are bolstered substan-
tially by the evidence of favorable stock market reaction to corporate
Return: January' vs. the Rest of the Year, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 561 (1984); Keim, Size-related Anomalies
and Stock Return Seasonality: Further Empirical Evidence, 12 J. FIN. ECON. 13 (1983); Gultekin &
Gultekin, Stock Market Seasonality: International Evidence, 12 J. FIN. ECON. 469 (1983).
The presence of these aberrations is important but is likely due to a combination of insider
trading in small firms and to tax-loss selling. See Woodward & Alexander, Insider Trading and the
Small Firm Effect (April, 1987) (manuscript on file with author). In any event, such anomalies in
no way affect the analysis in the text concerning the implications of the Efficient Capital Market
Hypothesis for a policy analysis of state anti-takeover legislation.
45. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 42, at 549-50.
46. Some have argued that the market systematically undervalues future events, al-
though there is no evidence that this is the case. If this is so, then current share prices will not
accurately reflect future prospects. Of course, if share prices systematically undervalue future
events then massive arbitrage possibilities are available in the market. This proposition is highly
improbable.
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announcements of new research and development projects.47 Such pro-
jects produce no current income to the firms that embark upon them.
The single explanation for the favorable stock market reaction is that
the anticipated future earnings expected to result from such projects are
reflected in the firm's current share price. In addition, a recent study
shows that firms involved in takeovers show no difference in their pre-
and post-merger research and development performance relative to
their competitors.48
Similarly, if takeovers forced managers to focus excessively on the
short term in order to avoid being taken over, then firms with high re-
search and development expenditures would be more likely to be taken
over than other firms. But this is not the case. A recent study of 324 high
research and development firms and 177 takeover targets during 1981-
1984 shows that firms with high research and development expenditures
are not more vulnerable to takeovers. 49 Indeed, a study by Bronwyn H.
Hall on the effect of takeover activity on corporate research and devel-
opment demonstrated that acquisition activity has been directed
toward firms and industries which are involved in lower levels of re-
search and development activity. 5 °
Managers owe a fiduciary duty to maximize value for sharehold-
ers. The claim that the long-term interests of a corporation permit a
firm's managers to ignore the current value of the firm's share prices
does not stand up to scrutiny. A firm's share price reflects all events,
past, present, and future, that bear on the firm's present value. Thus,
the argument that managers should be free to ignore current share
prices in favor of vaguely stated goals, such as serving other long-term
corporate interests, is really an argument to permit managers to ignore
their fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to shareholders. If such a
change in American law were permitted to occur through state anti-
takeover statutes, it would represent a massive expropriation of share-
holder wealth.
D. The Returns to Acquiring Firms
Just as there is a plethora of data on returns to shareholders of
target companies, so too is there an abundance of data on returns to
47. The OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Insti-
tutional Ownership, Tender Offers, and Long-Term Investments (Apr. 19, 1985); McConnell &
Muscarella, Corporate Capital Expenditure Decisions and Market Value of the Firm, 14 J. FIN.
ECON. 399 (1985) (finding favorable share price reactions to increased investments in research and
development except in the oil industry).
48. B. HALL, THE EFFECT OF TAKEOVER ACTIVITY ON CORPORATE RESEARCH AND DEVEL-
OPMENT (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 1987).
49. Id. at 28-29.
50. Id.
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shareholders of acquiring firms. Some of these studies shoiv that acquir-
ing firms enjoy positive abnormal returns (that is, returns in excess of
market expectations) during the time period immediately preceding the
takeover.5" Other studies, however, report significant losses to bidding
firms on or around the announcement date of a takeover. 52
These studies must be explained by those who subscribe to the the-
ory that takeovers are unambiguously good for the economy. If it can
be established that takeovers do not produce net gains to shareholders,
then state anti-takeover legislation can be justified on the grounds that
such legislation prevents the diversion of society's resources toward the
consummation of transactions that produce no net social gains.53 On
the basis of these studies it has been suggested that takeovers are con-
summated to benefit the managers of the acquiring firm rather than the
shareholders of the acquiring firm. Specifically, it has been suggested
that managers of acquiring firms have an incentive to engage in acquisi-
tions either: (1) because their compensation is linked to firm size,54 or
(2) because they prefer to control large amounts of corporate assets, 55
or (3) because controlling a large firm provides them with greater job
security.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that no one has even sug-
gested that a single state anti-takeover statute has been passed for the
express or implied purpose of controlling opportunistic behavior on the
part of managers of bidding firms. After all, a statute designed to im-
pede opportunistic takeovers by managers would impede friendly as
well as hostile takeovers. But no state anti-takeover statute even at-
tempts to impede friendly acquisitions. Thus, these statutes cannot even
51. Asquith, Bruner & Mullins, The Gains to Bidding Firms from Merger, Il J. FIN.
ECON. 121, 128 (1983) (finding a .9% positive cumulative abnormal return to bidders on the an-
nouncement of the transaction); Dodd & Ruback, Tender Offers and Stockholders Returns: An
Empirical Analysis, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 351, 368 (1977); (finding a 2.83% positive cumulative abnormal
return to bidders in the period from one month before to one month after the announcement of the
transaction).
52. M alatesta, The Wealth Effect of Merger Activity and the Objective Functions of Merg-
ing Firms. II J. FIN. ECON. 155 (1983) (finding a 5.4% negative cumulative abnormal return to
bidders in the period from one to six months following the announcement of the transaction);
Dodd, Merger Proposals, Management Discretion and Stockholder Wealth, 8 J. FIN. ECON. 105,
112 (1980) (finding a .62% negative cumulative abnormal return to bidders on the announcement
date of the transaction); Eger, An Empirical Test of the Redistribution Effect in Pure Exchange
Mergers, 18 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 547 (1983) (finding a negative cumulative abnormal return
to bidders of 4% in the period beginning five days after the announcement).
53. Put another way, if takeovers produce no social welfare gains, then the resources
spent in carrying out such transactions are real wealth losses to the economy.
54. W. J. BAUMOL, BUSINESS BEHAVIOR, VALUE, AND GROWTH (1969); Mueller, A Theory
of Conglomerate Mergers, 1969 Q.J. ECON. 643.
55. Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, 59 J. Bus. 197, 203 (1986).
56. Amihud & Lev, Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers.
12 BELL J. ECON. 605 (1981).
1988:467
HeinOnline -- 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 483 1988
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
be rationalized ex post on the ground that they mitigate the problem of
opportunistic acquisitions by managers. If such acquisitions are cur-
rently taking place, state anti-takeover statutes will simply shift the fo-
cus of such acquirers from hostile to friendly targets.
More importantly, upon close inspection, it appears that any am-
biguities in the empirical evidence on share price reactions to acquirers
may be due to problems with statistical modeling rather than to a lack
of real benefit to successful acquirers. As Paul H. Malatesta has pointed
out, in an efficient capital market, the expected gains or losses to bid-
ding firms will be incorporated rather quickly into the price of such
firms' stock. 7 Thus, gains to bidders will begin to be reflected in ac-
quirers' share prices at the moment such acquirers announce their in-
tention to engage in an acquisition program. Thus, as one would ex-
pect, several studies show that acquiring firms enjoy positive abnormal
returns (that is, returns in excess of market expectations) for an ex-
tended period prior to the actual announcement of a takeover transac-
tion.58 These positive abnormal returns should be attributed to the
market's expectations of the gains to be realized from the firm's acquisi-
tion program. If the actual acquisitions turn out to disappoint these
expectations, then the firm's share prices will react negatively around
the time of the announcement.
Obviously, from the perspective of the acquiring firms' sharehold-
ers, the relevant inquiry is whether the total gains to the bidding firms'
shareholders are positive or negative. If the losses that occur around the
acquisition date are offset by the gains experienced in preceding
months, then bidding firms' shareholders benefit by the process. Unfor-
tunately, there is very little data available on this issue, but it appears
likely that overall returns to bidders are positive. Three separate studies
show that total returns to acquirers are positive.
59
57. Malatesta, supra note 52, at 168.
58. Asquith, Merger Bids, Uncertainty, and Stockholder Returns, II J. FIN. ECON. 51, 59
(1983) (finding a 14.3% positive cumulative abnormal return to bidders in the period from 480 to
20 days prior to the announcement of the transaction); Malatesta, supra note 52 (finding a 4.3%
positive cumulative abnormal return to bidders in the period from 60 days prior to the announce-
ment of the transaction to the announcement of the transaction); Asquith, Bruner & Mullins,
supra note 50, at 128-30 (finding a 2.8% positive cumulative abnormal return to bidders in the
period from 20 days prior to the announcement of the transaction to the transaction date itself);
Dodd, supra note 52 (finding a 5.37% positive cumulative abnormal return to bidders in the period
from 40 days prior to the announcement of the transaction); Dodd & Ruback, supra note 51, at
368 (finding an 11.66% cumulative positive abnormal return to bidders in the period from 12
months to one month prior to the announcement of the transaction to the date of the announce-
ment); Mandelker, Risk and Return: The Case of Merging Firms, I J. FIN. ECON. 312 (1974) (find-
ing a 5.1% positive cumulative abnormal return to bidders in the period from 40 months to one
month prior to the announcement of the transaction).
59. See Asquith, supra note 58, at 59 (showing returns to bidders in the preannounce-
ment period to be positive 14.3%, as against a statistically insignificant return on the announce-
ment date of .2%): Dodd, supra note 52, at 112 (showing returns to bidders in the preannounce-
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From a societal perspective, the pivotal question is whether the
aggregate returns of takeovers are positive or negative. That is, even
assuming that bidders suffer aggregate welfare losses, takeovers are still
desirable from a societal perspective if the gains to the targets outweigh
the losses to the bidders. Once again, the available evidence suggests
that the gains from takeovers are positive.6 ° This is not surprising given
the ability of acquiring firm shareholders to draft compensation agree-
ments with managers that align the interests of such managers with
those of the shareholders.6 1 In light of the ability of shareholders to
draft such contracts, it would be surprising if compensation arrange-
ments did not eliminate the incentives of managers to consummate
takeovers that harm acquiring firm shareholders. Indeed, the surpris-
ingly large number of closely-held acquiring firms strongly suggests
that corporate acquisitions are in acquiring firms' interests.
IV. THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF STATE ANTI-TAKEOVER
LEGISLATION
The arguments presented above suggest that state statutes that im-
pede the operation of the market for corporate control will harm the
shareholders of all corporations. Such laws will result in less monitor-
ing of managers of all firms, slower replacement of ineffective and cor-
rupt incumbent management, less efficient deployment of society's re-
sources, and a greater number of corporate bankruptcies and
reorganizations.
ment period to be positive 5.37%, as against a negative return on the announcement date of.62%);
Dodd & Ruback, supra note 51, at 368 (showing returns to bidders in the preannouncement period
to be positive 11.66%, as against a negative return on the announcement date of 2.83%). Some of
these studies continue to examine share prices long into the period after the announcement of the
takeover. There are severe methodological problems with this approach because after the acquisi-
tion the resulting firm differs substantially from the acquiring firm.
60. Here studies examine average aggregate abnormal dollar returns instead of average
abnormal rates of return because acquiring firms are generally larger than target firms. As a conse-
quence of this size differential, if takeovers cause target firm shareholders to receive, on average, a
five percent positive rate of return, and bidding firm shareholders to suffer a negative return of five
percent, overall social welfare will decrease because the total dollar return from these transactions
will be negative.
But most studies report that aggregate abnormal dollar returns from takeovers are positive
even when the statistical methodology accounts for the differences in size between bidders and
targets. See Roll, supra note 55 (citing 1983 study of Bradley, Desai & Kim) (reporting statistically
insignificant average positive cumulative returns of $33.9 million); Halpern. Empirical Estimates of
the Amount and Distribution ofGains to Companies in Mergers, 46 J. Bus. 554, 569 (1973) (report-
ing statistically significant average positive cumulative returns of $27.35 million); Malatesta, supra
note 52, at 170 (reporting statistically significant average positive cumulative returns of $.29 mil-
lion); hut see Firth. Takeovers, Shareholder Returns, and the Theor " of /the Firm, 1980 Q.J. Econ.
248 (reporting statistically significant average negative cumulative returns of $36.6 million).
61. See Easterbrook, Managers' Discretion and Investors' Welfare: Theories and Eri-
dlence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 540. 557-64 (1984).
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These arguments are capable of empirical testing. By comparing
the share prices of firms before the adoption of anti-takeover statutes
with the share prices of such firms after the statutes are adopted, we can
observe whether the statutes actually harm shareholders. If the statutes
are, in fact, harmful to those who own shares in firms affected by the
statutes, the value of those shares should decline. Unfortunately, mea-
suring the effects of a particular anti-takeover statute is not as easy as it
seems, because in an efficient market, where there is considerable ad-
vance warning of an impending rule change, share prices will adjust
prior to the date on which the statute actually is adopted.
The Office of the Chief Economist at the Securities and Exchange
Commission has conducted a study of the effects of the Ohio anti-take-
over statute on shareholder wealth.62 This statute63 seems particularly
well suited for such a study due to the duration of only two weeks be-
tween the date on which the statute was proposed and the date upon
which the statute was enacted. 6 '
The SEC study examined 37 firms which were incorporated in
Ohio and were subject to hostile takeovers. In the three-day period dur-
ing which the bill was debated and passed, these firms suffered an ab-
normal decline in share value of 1.68% (correcting for price fluctuation
attributable to general market trends), which translates into a wealth
loss to shareholders of $754 million.65 In fact, it is likely that the effect
on Ohio firms was even more negative than this figure indicates. The
study probably underestimates the losses to shareholders of firms incor-
porated in Ohio because information about the probability of the stat-
ute being enacted was available before the day prior to the passage of
the statute and was reflected in the share prices of the relevant firms
prior to the eve of passage. In fact, if one begins counting ten days prior
to passage of the statute, to take account of the market's apprehensions
about the probability of passage, one finds that Ohio firms experienced
an average decline of 3.24% of their share value, which translates into
62. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION. supra note
13.
63. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.831 (Anderson 1985).
64. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, supra note 13, at 21. Other studies have found
negligible shareholder losses, but these studies involved statutes that had been anticipated by the
market for substantial periods of time. See, e.g., SCHUMANN, STATE REGULATION OF TAKEOVERS
AND SHAREHOLDER WEALTH: THE EFFECTS OF NEW YORK'S 1985 TAKEOVER STATUTES, Bureau of
Economics Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission 7 (Mar. 1987) (finding the negative
stock price reaction to the passage of the New York anti-takeover legislation to be less than one
percent, but with an eight-month period between the date of the proposal of an initial anti-take-
over law and ultimate enactment of the final bill) Romano, supra note 8 (studying the effects on
share prices of the statutes passed in Connecticut, Missouri and Pennsylvania, and finding statisti-
cally insignificant share price reactions where there was an average period of one month between
the proposal of a statute and its adoption).
65. See OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, supra note 13, at 17.
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an aggregate wealth loss to shareholders of $1.45 billion.66 Thus, state
anti-takeover statutes harm shareholders by deterring the probability
of a profitable takeover for target firms' shares.67
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR UNDERSTANDING OF CORPORATE LAW
Perhaps the best thing that can be said for the current rash of state
anti-takeover statutes is that they contribute mightily to our under-
Standing of how corporate law is made. While commentators divide
sharply on the issue of whether federal or state law should play the
dominant role in the regulation of the large, publicly held corporation,
both sides of the debate believe that there is robust competition among
states in the jurisdictional rivalry for corporate charters.
One school depicts states as competing among one another to at-
tract corporate charters by granting corporate officers and directors
wide latitude to act in ways that are clearly contrary to shareholder
interests."8 This group favors placing the authority to grant charters to
corporations in the hands of the federal government in order to prevent
state legislatures from exploiting shareholders to benefit their own state
budgets.69
The competing camp posits that market forces prompt state legis-
lators who desire to attract corporate charters to pass laws that enhance
shareholder wealth.70 This group favors leaving authority to regulate
the internal affairs of the nation's corporations in the hands of the
states.
Thus, while one school posits that state laws will benefit sharehold-
ers and the other posits that the laws will benefit managers, both
schools embrace the premise that there exists a jurisdictional competi-
tion for corporate charters in which states compete for business. But if
there is one clear lesson to be drawn from the state anti-takeover law
experience, it is that the legislatures passing these laws care less about
66. Id.
67. This is not recent news. See Smiley, The Effect of State Securities Statutes on Tender
Offtr Activity, 19 ECON. INQUIRY 426 (1981).
68. R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976);
Folk, Corporation Statutes 1959-1966, 1966 DUKE L.J. 875; Jennings, Federalization of Corporate
Law: Part Way or All the Wayv, 31 Bus. LAW. 991 (1976); Kaplan, Fiduciary Responsibility in the
Management of[the Corporation. 31 Bus. LAW. 883 (1976): Young, Federal Corporate Law, Feder-
alismi and the Federal Courts, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 146 (1977); Cary, Federalism and Corpo-
rate Low: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974).
69. See sources cited in supra note 68.
70. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 306-07 (2d ed. 1977); R. WINTER, GOVERN-
MENT AND THE CORPORATION 28-42 (1978); Baysinger & Butler, The Role ofCorporate Law in the
Theory ofthe Firol, 28 J.L. & ECON. 179, 181-82 (1985): Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revis-
ited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delavare's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 913,
919-20 (1982).
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attracting chartering business than they care about maximizing politi-
cal support from the interest groups lobbying for passage of the laws. In
a rivalrous political world, it is virtually a tautology that successful pol-
iticians must place concern for political support above other concerns
in order to continue to be re-elected. The fact that state politicians have
been responding to the interests of politically powerful in-state incum-
bent management teams, at the expense of concerns about attracting
chartering revenue, is not surprising." As such, these statutes appear
less consistent with either of the existing theories of state corporate
codes than with the economic theory of regulation, which posits that
politicians will be more concerned with maximizing their own political
support than with maximizing the chartering revenues of the state.72
The emergence of the economic theory of regulation as the most
promising candidate for a unified theory of corporate law has impor-
tant implications for the current debate about whether state anti-take-
over laws should be pre-empted by Congress through the passage of a
more comprehensive law governing takeovers. The economic theory of
regulation predicts that, like the current state laws, any law promul-
gated at the federal level will reflect the outcome of political maneuver-
ing rather than the expression of public interest policy concerns.
Thus, one's preference for federal pre-emption in this area hinges
upon whether one is more favorably disposed towards the interests
likely to prevail at the federal level than towards the interests currently
71. Clearly, state anti-takeover statutes benefit incumbent management teams at the ex-
pense of shareholders and thus may, at first blush, appear consistent with the managerial exploita-
tion theory of corporate law. That theory, however, posits that the reason state legislatures pass
corporate laws such as anti-takeover measures is to attract corporate chartering business. This
does not appear to be the case. These statutes are passed to garner political support from the
existing firms, not to attract new firms.
72. The economic theory of regulation posits that legal rules are demanded and supplied
like any other commodity. According to the theory, each law reflects a competitive equilibrium
among the rival interest groups affected by the law. Thus, according to the theory, legal rules are
demanded by relatively cohesive, well-organized special interest groups who successfully out bid
competing groups in order to obtain the rules. The currency used in the bidding process consists of
political support in election campaigns, speaking honoraria, campaign contributions, and other
lobbying expenditures.
The costs associated with these rules sometimes are borne by rival groups but more often are
shouldered by the relatively unorganized members of the population for whom the costs (I) of
becoming informed about the relevant issues, and (2) of organizing with other, similarly situated
people into an effective political coalition, are sufficiently high as to make "rational ignorance"
(see in/i'a note 73) their most effective political strategy. For articles which describe the economic
theory of regulation, see Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.
Sci. 3 (197 1); Posner, Theories of Econonic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 335 (1974);
Peltzman, Towards a More General Theory of Economic Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976);
McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic TheorYof R'egulation. 16 J. LEGAL
STuD. 101 (1987). For a recent application of the economic theory of regulation to the corporate
law of Delaware, see Macey & Miller, Toward an Interest Group Theory qf Delaware Corporate
Law, 65 T'x. L. Rrv. 469, 498-509 (1987).
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prevailing at the state level. If bidder and shareholder interests 73 are
likely to enjoy greater representation at the federal level than at the
state level, then a federal statute will be better for the economy than the
current state statutes. And, because bidder and shareholder interests
appear to be peculiarly underrepresented in states with strong anti-
takeover laws, it appears unlikely that a federal law would be worse
than the current state laws.
Indeed, the current generation of state anti-takeover laws appears
to be a paradigmatic example of the sort of jurisdictional exploitation
that frequently serves to justify federal intervention. Specifically, "citi-
zens of the legislating state may benefit from the law while citizens of
another state bear the costs."'7 4 Shareholders do not appear to be par-
ticularly concentrated within any single state, a fact that suggests that
their interests systematically will be underrepresented in the political
process at both the state and federal levels.
VI. CONCLUSION
The current debate on whether state anti-takeover legislation
should be pre-empted by federal regulation starts with the premise that
regulation of the tender offer process is needed. The only question is
whether the rules should be generated by Congress or at the state level.
While the arguments in this Article are directed at the state anti-take-
over laws, they apply with equal force to the Williams Act, which is the
federal law that regulates takeovers.7 5 Like the state anti-takeover stat-
utes, the Williams Act-which places disclosure obligations on tender
offerors-imposes significant delays in the tender offer process and
raises the costs of mounting a tender offer. Thus it reduces the incen-
tives for individuals and firms to make such offers.
7 6
73. Institutional investors are likely to be the only shareholding interests with sufficient
size to overcome the rational ignorance and collective action problems that prevent individual
shareholders from joining together to oppose anti-takeover legislation.
Rational ignorance refers to the situation in which the costs of becoming informed about a
particular issue are sufficiently high as to dwarf the benefits of acquiring the relevant information.
For example, if the effects of a measure on a person's wealth will be only $ 100, it is rational for that
person to decline to invest more than $100 to find out if it is in his or her best interests to vote for
the measure.
Similarly, a problem of collective action exists whenever a group of similarly situated people
face high transaction costs and free-rider problems when they attempt to organize into an effective
political coalition.
74. Romano, supra note 8, at 140.
75. Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454-57, adding 15 U.S.C. §§
78m(d)-(e) & 78n(d)-(f).
76. See Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and
the Regulation o Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. REv. I, 13 (1978) ("the disclosure requirements of
the Williams Act .. .dilute the value of the property right in privately produced information");
Carney, Toward a More Pertect Marketfor Corporate Control. 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 593, 597-609
1988:467
HeinOnline -- 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 489 1988
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
This Article has pointed out that, while state anti-takeover laws
harm shareholders, shareholders may benefit from intra-firm rules that
enable them to mitigate if not solve the collective action problem they
face when confronted by a tender offer for their shares. It follows that
the proper role of the legal system is to facilitate the intra-firm con-
tracting process.
As this Article has shown, however, one of the primary impedi-
ments to the adoption of optimal intra-firm rules regarding takeovers is
the fact that the interests of shareholders often conflict with the inter-
ests of managers and directors. Managers and directors are often pri-
marily interested in ensuring their continued tenure in office, while the
primary concern of shareholders is in obtaining the best possible price
for their shares. Thus, it is ironic that the existing panoply of state and
federal law is designed to make takeovers more difficult; existing man-
agement already has strong incentives to install devices that impede
takeovers. Management does not need to be motivated to detect prob-
lems with a firm's array of defensive strategies. Indeed, if shareholders
need protection at all, it is in ensuring that management is not overzeal-
ous in thwarting tender offers by outsiders. There are no statutes that
provide such protection for shareholders. Rather, it seems 
that the reg
ulations we observe at both the state and federal level are the result of
interest group pressures and do not reflect the real needs of
shareholders.
A public interest statute regulating takeovers might protect the
shareholders of some firms from intra-firm defensive tactics that make
hostile acquisitions too difficult. Such statutes would not protect share-
holders from bidders offering to pay them a premium for their shares.
This is what our current legal system does, despite the fact that in a
world of efficient capital markets, the willingness of an outsider to pay
shareholders a premium for their shares is hardly a sign of exploitation
Such outsiders should be applauded-not regulated.
Thus, the debate about federal pre-emption of state anti-takeover
laws is a struggle over the lesser of two evils. The outcome will reflect a
political compromise, with the benefit going to the interest group with
the greatest political clout. It will not reflect an attempt by Congress to
realize a legitimate public policy goal. This is particularly unfortunate
in light of the vital importance that a robust market for corporate con-
trol plays in the development and restructuring of the national
economy.
(1984) (regulatory delay caused by the Williams Act raises the price of tender offers and "will
inevitably lead to fewer takeover bids."): Macey & Netter, Regulation 13D and the Regulatory
Process. 65 WASH. U.L.Q. 131 (1987) (discussing costs associated with one aspect of the Williams
Act, the requirement that the bidder's identity and intentions be disclosed within ten days of the
acquisition of five percent of a target firm's shares).
HeinOnline -- 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 490 1988
